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Minimal assumption derivation of a Bell-type inequality
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John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with quantum
mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirical adequate hidden-variable
models might exist, which presuppose a weaker notion of local causality. We will show that a Bell-
type inequality can be derived also from these weaker assumptions.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
The violation of Bell’s inequality by the outcome of
an EPR-type spin experiment [1, 2] seems to exclude a
local theory with hidden variables. The underlying re-
ductio ad absurdum proof infers on the grounds of the
empirical falsification of the derived inequality that at
least one of the required assumptions must be false. The
force of the argument requires that the derivation be de-
ductive and that all assumptions be explicit. We aim to
extract a minimal set of assumptions needed for a deduc-
tive derivation of Bell’s inequalities given perfect corre-
lation of outcomes of an EPR-type spin experiment with
parallel settings.
One of the assumptions in Bell’s original derivation
[3] was determinism. Later, he succeeded in deriving a
similar inequality without determinism [4], placing in its
stead an assumption later dubbed local causality [5]. As
Bell stressed, the notion of local causality he and oth-
ers used might be challenged. In [6] it was pointed out,
that Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle [7] indeed
suggests a weaker form of local causality. We will prove
here, however, that even from this weaker notion Bell’s
inequality can still be derived.1
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FIG. 1: Setup of the EPR-Bohm experiment. Cf. [9, p. 140].
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1 Several of the issues we present in this paper are discussed in
II. THE EPR-BOHM EXPERIMENT
Consider the so-called EPR-Bohm (EPRB) experiment
[1, 2]. Two spin- 1
2
particles in the singlet state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉) (1)
are separated in such a way that one particle moves to
a measurement apparatus in the left wing of the experi-
mental setting and the other particle to a measurement
apparatus in the right wing (see FIG. 1). The experi-
menter can choose arbitrarily one of three directions in
which the spin is measured with a Stern-Gerlach magnet.
The following terminology follows the reconstruction
by Wigner [10] and which van Fraassen [11] has sub-
sequently expanded on. The event type2 that the left
(right) measurement apparatus is set to measure the spin
in direction i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is symbolized by Li (Ri). Lai
(Rai ) symbolizes the event type that the measurement
outcome in the left (right) wing of a spin measurement
in direction i is a. There are two possible measurement
outcomes spin up (a=+) and spin down (a=−) for each
particle in each direction. The letter j ∈ {1, 2, 3} will be
used like i to symbolize directions and b ∈ {+,−} like a
to symbolize measurement outcomes. Formulas in which
the variables i, j, a, and b appear are meant to hold—if
not otherwise stated—for all possible values of the vari-
ables. p(X) denotes the probability of an event type X ,
which is empirically measurable as the relative frequency
of all runs of an EPRB experiment in which the event
type X is instantiated, with respect to all runs. p(X∧Y )
is the probability of the event type ‘X and Y ’, measur-
able as the relative frequency of all runs in which both
X and Y are instantiated. p(X |Y ) = p(X ∧ Y )/p(Y )
is the conditional probability of the event type X given
the event type Y , measurable as the relative frequency
of instantiations of X with respect to the subensemble of
more detail in [8].
2 We will speak of event types to distinguish them from the token
events which instantiate corresponding event types.
2all runs in which Y is instantiated. E.g.
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Li ∧Rj) (2)
denotes the probability that the measurement outcome
is a on the left and b on the right, when measuring in
direction i on the left and in direction j on the right.
These probabilities are predicted by quantum mechanics
as
p(L+i ∧R+j |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
sin2
ϕij
2
, (3)
p(L−i ∧R−j |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
sin2
ϕij
2
, (4)
p(L+i ∧R−j |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
cos2
ϕij
2
, (5)
p(L−i ∧R+j |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
cos2
ϕij
2
, (6)
where ϕij denotes the angle between the two measure-
ment directions i and j. Also, the outcomes on each side
are predicted separately to be completely random:
p(Lai |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
, (7)
p(Rbj |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
. (8)
III. LOCAL CAUSALITY
The derivations of Bell-type inequalities known to us
which do not presuppose determinism assume instead
what John Bell calls local causality [5, 12]. That is,
the assumption that there is common cause variable3 V
which takes on values q ∈ I = {q1, q2, q3, . . . , qk} such
that for event types ‘the variable V has the value q’ (Vq)
we have
∑
q p(Vq) = 1 and
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Vq ∧ Li ∧Rj) = p(Lai |Vq ∧ Li)
× p(Rbj |Vq ∧Rj). (9)
Other frequently used names for this condition are fac-
torizability [13] and strong locality [14, 15]. It is usually
justified by pointing out that it follows from the conjunc-
tion of the following three conditions, which are called
completeness (equation (10)) and locality (equations (11)
and (12)) [14, 15], outcome independence and parameter
independence [16], or causality and hidden locality [11]:
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Vq ∧ Li ∧Rj) = p(Lai |Vq ∧ Li ∧Rj)
× p(Rbj |Vq ∧ Li ∧Rj), (10)
p(Lai |Li ∧Rj ∧ Vq) = p(Lai |Li ∧ Vq), (11)
p(Raj |Li ∧Rj ∧ Vq) = p(Raj |Rj ∧ Vq). (12)
3 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this partition is discrete
and finite. As will become clear in the following, the derivation
of Bell’s inequality can also be done without this restriction.
Equation (10) says that event types Vq or the variable
V “screens off” Lai and R
b
j from each other [11, 13].
Van Fraassen [11] pointed out, that equation (10) can
be motivated through Reichenbach’s Principle of Com-
mon Cause (PCC) [7]. The principle states, that when-
ever two different event types A and B are statistically
correlated
p(A ∧B) 6= p(A)p(B) (13)
and neither A is causally relevant for B nor B for A,
there exists a common cause variable V with values q ∈
I = {q1, q2, q3, . . . , qk} (
∑
q p(Vq) = 1) such that A and
B given Vq are uncorrelated:
p(A ∧B|Vq) = p(A|Vq)p(B|Vq). (14)
In its original formulation the principle is stated only for
a common cause event type C, which is included in our
formulation as the special case where Vq can take only
two values: Vq1 = C, Vq2 = ¬C (‘not C’). The princi-
ple was formulated for general common cause variables
by Hofer-Szabo´ et al. [17] and Placek [18]. Besides the
screening-off condition Reichenbach [7] and Hofer-Szabo´
et al. [17] stipulate further restrictions on the common
cause variable, which are, however, irrelevant for our pur-
poses.
Now, as can be seen from equations (3)-(6), the event
type Lai is in general correlated with event type R
b
j . It is
p(Lai |Li ∧Rj) = p(Rbj |Li ∧Rj) =
1
2
, (15)
and therefore
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Li ∧Rj) 6= p(Lai |Li ∧Rj)p(Rbj |Li ∧Rj)
except for ϕij =
pi
2
mod pi. (16)
Supposing that Lai is not causally relevant for R
b
j and vice
versa (which is reinforced by the fact that the setup of
the experiment can be chosen so that the instantiations
of Lai and R
b
j in each run of the experiment are space-
like separated), PCC requires a common cause variable
which fulfills equation (10). There are several different
correlations; e.g. L+1 is correlated with R
+
2 , and L
+
2 is
correlated with R+3 . For each of these correlations PCC
enforces the consequence that a common cause variable
exists. As stressed in [6] nothing in PCC dictates that the
common cause variables of the different correlations have
to be the same. However, in all the derivations of Bell’s
inequality known to us this identification is made never-
theless. It is further shown in [6] and [17], that for any
set of correlations it is mathematically possible to con-
struct common cause variables. The authors concluded
in [6] that the apparent contradiction between this pos-
sibility and the claim that the EPRB correlations do not
allow for a common cause variable [11, 13], is resolved by
pointing out that in the derivation of Bell’s inequality a
common common cause variable for all measurements is
assumed:
3“The crucial assumption in the [...] derivation
of the [Clauser-Horne] inequality is that [the
two-valued common cause variable] is a [two-
valued common cause variable] for all four
correlated pairs, i. e. that [Vq] is a common
common cause [variable], shared by different
correlations. Without this assumption Bell’s
inequality cannot be derived. But there does
not seem to be any obvious reason why com-
mon causes should also be common common
causes, whether of quantum or of any other
sort of correlations.” (Italics in the original.)
Showing the mathematical possibility of constructing
common cause variables for any set of correlations and in
particular for the correlations found in the EPRB experi-
ment is not sufficient for proving the existence of a phys-
ically “natural” hidden-variable model for that experi-
ment, however. Besides being common cause variables
(thus fulfilling equation (10)), parameter independence
should hold, too (equations (11) and (12)). Also, they
should not be correlated with the measurement choices.
As shown by Szabo´ [19], it is possible to construct a
model which fulfills these requirements for each of the
common cause variables separately. However, the con-
junctions and other logical combinations of the event
types that the common cause variables have certain val-
ues correlate in that model with the measurement opera-
tions. Whether a model can be constructed without these
correlations was posed as an open question by Szabo´.
This question is answered negatively by the derivation of
Bell’s inequality that we present in the remainder of this
article.
IV. BELL’S INEQUALITY FROM SEPARATE
COMMON CAUSES
A. A weak screening-off principle
Consider an EPRB experiment where the same direc-
tion i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is chosen in both wings. That is, in
each run the event type Li∧Ri is instantiated. With this
special setting quantum mechanics predicts (see equa-
tions (3)-(8), with ϕij = 0) that the measurement out-
comes in each wing are random but that the outcomes in
one wing are perfectly correlated with the outcomes in
the other wing: if and only if the spin of the left particle
is up, then the spin of the right particle is down, and vice
versa. We refer to this assumption as perfect correlation,
or PCORR for short.
Assumption 1 (PCORR)
pii(R
−
i |L+i ) = 1 and pii(L+i |R−i ) = 1. (17)
We use here the definition
pij(. . . )
.
= p(. . . |Li ∧Rj). (18)
Large spatial separation of coinciding events of type Lai
and Rbj suggests that the respective instances are indeed
distinct events. This excludes an explanation of the cor-
relations by event identity, as is the case, for example,
with a tossed coin for the perfect correlation of the event
types ‘heads up’ and ‘tails down’. Such a perfect corre-
lation is explained in that every instance of ‘heads up’
is also an instance of ‘tails down’, and vice versa. Since
the separation is even space-like, no Lai or R
b
j should be
causally relevant for the other. We refer to these two
assumptions as separability, SEP for short, and locality 1
(LOC1).
Assumption 2 (SEP) The coinciding instances of Lai
and Rbj are distinct events.
Assumption 3 (LOC1) No Lai or R
b
j is causally rele-
vant for the other.
Rather, there should be a common cause variable; that
is, we assume PCC.
Assumption 4 (PCC) If two event types A and B
are correlated and the correlation cannot be explained
by direct causation nor event identity, then there ex-
ists a common cause variable V , with values q ∈ I =
{q1, q2, q3, . . . , qk} such that
∑
q p(Vq) = 1 and
p(A ∧B|Vq) = p(A|Vq)p(B|Vq), ∀q.
As already mentioned, we omit the other Reichenbachian
conditions [7, 17] since they are not necessary for our
derivation.
This principle together with the assumptions PCORR,
SEP and LOC1 implies that there is for each of the EPRB
correlations a (separate) common cause variable V +−ij
with q ∈ I+−ij .
Result 1
pii(L
+
i ∧R−i |V +−ii q) = pii(L+i |V +−ii q)
× pii(R−i |V +−ii q). (19)
Note that common cause variables can be different for
different correlations.
B. Perfect correlation and “determinism”
We now show that from the fact that a perfect cor-
relation is screened off by some variable it follows that
without loss of generality the common cause variable can
be assumed to be two-valued and that the having of one
of the two values of the variables is necessary and suffi-
cient for the instantiation of the two perfectly correlated
event types, cf. [20].
Let A and B be perfectly correlated,
p(A|B) = p(B|A) = 1,
4and screened-off from each other by a common cause vari-
able,
p(A ∧B|Vq) = p(A|Vq)p(B|Vq).
We can split the set I of all values V completely into two
disjunct subsets, namely in the subset I+ of those values
of V for which p(A∧Vq) is not zero and in the subset I−
of those for which it is zero:
I+ = {q ∈ I : p(A ∧ Vq) 6= 0},
I− = {q ∈ I : p(A ∧ Vq) = 0},
I = I− ∪ I+, I− ∩ I+ = ∅.
¿From this definition of I− it follows already that
p(A|Vq) = 0, ∀q ∈ I−, (20)
i. e. that Vq with q ∈ I+ is necessary for A. Moreover, for
all q ∈ I+ we have by screening off and perfect correlation
p(A|Vq) = p(A|B ∧ Vq) = 1. (21)
That the variable has a value in I+ is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for A. The following calculation shows
that Vq with q ∈ I+ is also necessary and sufficient for
B.
¿From perfect correlation it follows that
p(B|A ∧ Vq) = 1, ∀q ∈ I+.
That Vq screens off B from A yields
p(B|A ∧ Vq) = p(B|Vq).
Together with the previous equation this implies that Vq
is sufficient for B for all q ∈ I+:
p(B|Vq) = 1 ∀q ∈ I+. (22)
If q ∈ I− we have by definition p(A ∧ Vq) = 0, which
implies
p(A ∧B ∧ Vq) = 0.
By perfect correlation we have therefore also p(B∧Vq) =
0, which in turn implies that
p(B|Vq) = 0, ∀q ∈ I−, (23)
which means that Vq with q ∈ I+ is also necessary for B.
This calculation shows that in the case of a perfect
correlation the set of values of the common cause vari-
able decomposes into two relevant sets. This means that
whenever there is an (arbitrarily-valued) common cause
variable for a perfect correlation, there is also a two-
valued common cause variable, namely the disjunction
of all event types Vq for which q ∈ I+ or q ∈ I−, respec-
tively.
C = ∨q∈I+Vq,
¬C = ∨q∈I−Vq.
We refer to C as a common cause event type. In the case
of a perfect correlation no generality is achieved by allow-
ing for a more than two-valued common cause variable;
if there is a common cause variable for a perfect correla-
tion, there is also a common cause event type. Moreover,
the common cause event type is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the event types that are screened off by it
(equations (20), (21), (22) and (23)).
Result 1 thus implies that there is a common cause
event type C+−ii such that
pii(L
+
i |C+−ii ) = pii(R−i |C+−ii ) = 1, (24)
pii(L
+
i |¬C+−ii ) = pii(R−i |¬C+−ii ) = 0. (25)
The sub- and superscripts of C+−ii refer to C
+−
ii being the
common cause event type of L+i and R
−
i .
The outcome of a spin measurement is always either +
or − and nothing else. We call this assumption exactly
one of exactly two possible outcomes (EX).
Assumption 5 (EX)
pii(L
+
i ) + pii(L
−
i ) = 1, pii(L
+
i ∧ L−i ) = 0, (26)
pii(R
+
i ) + pii(R
−
i ) = 1, pii(R
+
i ∧R−i ) = 0. (27)
As stressed by Fine [21], among the actual measurements
there are always runs in which no outcome is registered,
which is normally attributed to the limited efficiency of
the detectors and not taken to the statistics. If one as-
sumes instead, that part of these no-outcome runs are
caused by the hidden variable, then it is possible to con-
struct empirically adequate models for the EPRB experi-
ments [22, 23]. With assumption 5, we explicitly exclude
such models.
With assumption 5, while C+−ii is necessary and suffi-
cient for L+i and R
−
i , its complement, i. e. ¬C+−ii is nec-
essary and sufficient for the opposite outcomes, i. e. L−i
and R+i :
pii(L
−
i |C+−ii ) = pii(R+i |C+−ii ) = 0, (28)
pii(L
−
i |¬C+−ii ) = pii(R+i |¬C+−ii ) = 1. (29)
C. A minimal theory for spins
In section IVB it was found that C+−ii is sufficient for
L+i given parallel settings (Li ∧ Ri), see equation (24).
I. e. the conjunction C+−ii ∧ Li ∧ Ri is sufficient for L+i .
But because of space-like separation of events of type L+i
and Ri that are instantiated in the same run, the lat-
ter types should not be causally relevant for the former.
The measurement choice in one wing should be causally
irrelevant for the outcomes (and the choices) in the other
wing. Therefore we should discard Ri from the sufficient
conjunction. The part C+−ii ∧ Li alone is sufficient for
L+i . A similar reasoning can be applied to R
+
j , Rj and
¬C+−jj , cf. equation (29). This is our assumption local-
ity 2 (LOC2).
5Assumption 6 (LOC2) If Li ∧Ri ∧X is sufficient for
L+i , then Li∧X alone is sufficient for L+i ; and similarly
for R+j , i. e. if Lj ∧ Rj ∧ Y is sufficient for R+j , then
Rj ∧ Y alone is sufficient for R+j .
Moreover, the remaining part C+−ii ∧Li isminimally suffi-
cient, in the sense that none of its parts is sufficient on its
own.4 If, for example, C+−11 is instantiated, but we do not
choose to measure L1, then L
+
1 will not be instantiated.
That is to say, we cannot discard yet another conjunct of
Li ∧C+−ii as we discarded Ri from C+−ii ∧ Li ∧Ri.
Let us turn to necessary conditions for L+i . To begin
with, Li is necessary: If there is no Stern-Gerlach magnet
properly set up (Li) the particle is not deflected either up-
or downwards; similarly for L−i , R
+
j and R
−
j . Roughly
speaking, no outcome without measurement (NOWM).
Assumption 7 (NOWM)
p(L+i ∧ ¬Li) = 0, p(L−i ∧ ¬Li) = 0, (30)
p(R+j ∧ ¬Rj) = 0, p(R−j ∧ ¬Rj) = 0. (31)
Second, we saw in section IVB that if parallel settings
are chosen and ¬C+−ii is instantiated an event of type L+i
does never occur. In other words, ¬C+−ii ∧Li∧Ri implies
¬L+i :
¬C+−ii ∧ Li ∧Ri → ¬L+i . (32)
Again we propose a locality condition based on the
idea that the measurement choice in one wing should be
causally irrelevant for the outcomes (and the choices) in
the other wing:5 If ¬C+−ii ∧Li∧Ri are sufficient for ¬L+i ,
then ¬C+−ii ∧ Li alone should be sufficient for ¬L+i . A
similar reasoning can be applied to R+j , Rj and C
+−
jj , cf.
equation (28).
Assumption 8 (LOC3) If Li ∧Ri ∧X is sufficient for
¬L+i , then Li ∧X alone is sufficient for ¬L+i ; and simi-
larly for ¬R+j , i. e. if Lj ∧Rj ∧ Y is sufficient for ¬R+j ,
then Rj ∧ Y alone is sufficient for ¬R+j .
By LOC3 it follows from equation (32) that
¬C+−ii ∧ Li → ¬L+i . (33)
This is equivalent to
L+i ∧ Li → C+−ii , (34)
and also to
L+i ∧ Li → C+−ii ∧ Li. (35)
4 Minimal sufficient conditions as definied by [24] and [25].
5 The following version of LOC3 is slightly different from an ear-
lier version of the article. We thank Gabor Hofer-Szabo´, Miklos
Re´dei and In˜aki San Pedro for their comments.
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FIG. 2: Minimal theories for outcomes of spin measurements.
According to equation (30), Li is necessary for L
+
i . That
means L+i → Li, but also L+i → L+i ∧ Li. Above, we
have found (eq. (35)) that L+i ∧ Li → C+−ii ∧ Li. Alto-
gether, this entails L+i → Li∧C+−ii , i. e. that Li∧C+−ii is
necessary for L+i . Moreover, it is a minimally necessary
condition in the sense of [24] since it does not contain any
disjuncts. All in all: C+−ii ∧ Li is a minimally necessary
and minimally sufficient condition for L+i . In a similar
vein we find that Rj ∧¬C+−jj is minimally necessary and
minimally sufficient for R+j . We have thus derived in par-
ticular the four minimal theories in the sense of [24] as
illustrated in FIG. 2.
In a formal notation the four minimal theories read
as the following four equations, where ↔ is the usual
biconditional, which means that the left-hand side implies
the right-hand side and vice versa.6 This intermediate
result is referred to as minimal theories (MTH).
Result 2 (MTH)
(L1 ∧C+−11 )↔ L+1 , (2(a))
(L2 ∧C+−22 )↔ L+2 , (2(b))
(R2 ∧ ¬C+−22 )↔ R+2 , (2(c))
(R3 ∧ ¬C+−33 )↔ R+3 . (2(d))
6 For details see [24] and [25]. Note in particular that a correct
formal notation of a minimal theory uses what Graßhoff et. al.
[24, 25] call a double conditional.
6From the logical relations (2(a)), (2(b)), (2(c)) and
(2(d)) the following probabilities can be derived:
p(L+1 ∧R+2 ) = p(L1 ∧ C+−11 ∧R2 ∧ ¬C+−22 ),
p(L+2 ∧R+3 ) = p(L2 ∧ C+−22 ∧R3 ∧ ¬C+−33 ),
p(L+1 ∧R+3 ) = p(L1 ∧ C+−11 ∧R3 ∧ ¬C+−33 ).
By NOWM (equations (30) and (31)) p(L+1 ∧R+2 ) is the
same as p(L+1 ∧R+2 ∧L1∧R2) etc. and the above equations
read:
p(L+1 ∧R+2 ∧L1 ∧R2)
= p(L1 ∧ C+−11 ∧R2 ∧ ¬C+−22 ), (36)
p(L+2 ∧R+3 ∧L2 ∧R3)
= p(L2 ∧ C+−22 ∧R3 ∧ ¬C+−33 ), (37)
p(L+1 ∧R+3 ∧L1 ∧R3)
= p(L1 ∧ C+−11 ∧R3 ∧ ¬C+−33 ). (38)
D. No conspiracy
The events of type C+−ii are not supposed to be in-
fluenced by the measuring operations Li and Rj . One
reason for this assumption is that the measurement oper-
ations can be chosen arbitrarily before the particles enter
the magnetic field of the Stern-Gerlach magnets and that
an event of type C+−ii is assumed to happen before the
particles arrive at the magnets. Therefore a causal in-
fluence of the measurement operations on events of type
C+−ii would be tantamount to backward causation. Also
an inverse statement is supposed to hold: The event types
C+−ii are assumed not to be causally relevant for the mea-
surement operations. This is meant to rule out some kind
of “cosmic conspiracy” that whenever an event of type
C+−ii is instantiated, the experimenter would be “forced”
to use certain measurement operations. This causal in-
dependence between C+−ii and the measurement opera-
tions is assumed to imply the corresponding statistical
independence. The same is assumed to hold also for con-
junctions of common cause event types. We refer to this
condition as no conspiracy (NO-CONS).
Assumption 9 (NO-CONS)
p(C+−ii ∧ ¬C+−jj |Li ∧Rj) = p(C+−ii ∧ ¬C+−jj ). (39)
By this condition of statistical independence the three
probabilities considered above can be transformed. That
is, we have, for instance
p(L+1 ∧R+2 |L1 ∧R2) .=
p(L+1 ∧R+2 ∧ L1 ∧R2)
p(L1 ∧R2)
(i)
=
p(L1 ∧ C+−11 ∧R2 ∧ ¬C+−22 )
p(L1 ∧R2)
.
= p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 |L1 ∧R2)
(ii)
= p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 )
(iii)
= p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 ∧ C+−33 )
+p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 ).
The dotted equations are true by definition of condi-
tional probability. In step (i) equation (36) was used.
Step (ii) is valid by “no conspiracy” (equation (39)), and
(iii) by a theorem of probability calculus, according to
which p(A) = p(A ∧ B) + p(A ∧ ¬B) for any A and B.
Transforming the other two expressions in a similar way,
we arrive at
p(L+1 ∧R+2 |L1 ∧R2)
= p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 ∧ C+−33 )
+ p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 ), (40)
p(L+2 ∧R+3 |L2 ∧R3)
= p(C+−11 ∧C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 )
+ p(¬C+−11 ∧C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 ), (41)
p(L+1 ∧R+3 |L1 ∧R3)
= p(C+−11 ∧C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 )
+ p(C+−11 ∧ ¬C+−22 ∧ ¬C+−33 ). (42)
Since both terms of the right-hand side of the last equa-
tion appear in the sum of the right-hand sides of the first
two equations, the following version of the Bell inequality
(BELL) follows7.
Result 3 (BELL)
p(L+1 ∧R+3 |L1 ∧R3) ≤ p(L+1 ∧R+2 |L1 ∧R2)
+ p(L+2 ∧R+3 |L2 ∧R3). (43)
This inequality has been empirically falsified, see
e. g. [26].
The inequality was derived from the following assump-
tions.
• Perfect correlation (PCORR),
• separability (SEP),
7 It was first derived in this form by Wigner [10].
7• locality 1 (LOC1),
• principle of common cause (PCC),
• exactly one of exactly two possible outcomes (EX),
• locality 2 (LOC2),
• no outcome without measurement (NOWM),
• locality 3 (LOC3),
• no conspiracy (NO-CONS).
This is a version of Bell’s theorem. It says: If these
assumptions are true, the Bell inequality is true. The
derivation of the Bell inequality presented here is an im-
provement on the usual Bell-type arguments, such as
[5] and [11], in two respects: First, it does not assume
a common common cause variable for different correla-
tions. Second, contrary to the usual locality conditions,
the ones assumed here do not presuppose a solution to
the problems posed by the relation between causal and
statistical (in)dependence (see e. g. [27]).
V. DISCUSSION
Our claim to have presented a minimal assumption
derivation of a Bell-type inequality is relative: our set
of assumptions is weaker than any set known to us from
which a Bell-type inequality can be derived and that con-
tains the assumption of perfect correlation (PCORR). It
was one of the achievements of Clauser and Horne [12]
to show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived also
if the correlations of outcomes of parallel spin measure-
ments are not assumed to be perfect. Our assumption
of correlation is stronger than the one used by Clauser
and Horne. However, they assume a common common
cause variable for all correlations, which is a stronger as-
sumption than our assumption of possibly different com-
mon cause variables for each correlation (PCC). We have
not been able to derive a Bell-type inequality without
assuming perfect correlation and allowing different com-
mon cause variables. If PCORR is indeed a necessary
assumption for our derivation of the Bell inequality, it
should be possible to construct a model in which PCORR
does not hold (being violated by an arbitrary small de-
viation, say). Since the actually measured correlations
are never perfect—a fact that is usually attributed to ex-
perimental imperfections—it is not obvious how such a
model could be refuted.
Our notion of local causality might be challenged as
follows. Even though nothing in PCC dictates that in
general the common cause variables of different correla-
tions have to be the same, there might be strong grounds
for why they are the same in the context of the EPRB
experiment. Indeed, Bell argued for his choice of local
Vq
Li Rj
Lai R
b
j
FIG. 3: The two backward light cones of two measurement
outcomes. The total state of the overlap is taken to define a
common common cause variable V , which can take on certain
values q. Cf. [9, p. 55]
.
causality along the following lines.8 Assume that Lai and
Rbj are positively correlated. Then
p(Lai |Rbj ∧ Li ∧Rj) > p(Lai |Li ∧Rj). (44)
Since coinciding instances of Lai and R
b
j are space-like
separated, neither is causally relevant for the other.
Rather, the correlation should be explained by exhibit-
ing some common causes in the overlap of the backward
light cones of the coinciding instances. An instance of,
say, Lai raises the probability of an instantiation of one
of the common causally relevant factors, and this raises
the probability of an instantiation of Rbj . But given the
total state of the overlap of the backward light cones of
two coinciding instances, the probability of, say, Rbj is
assumed to be the same whether Lai is instantiated or
not. If the total state of the overlap of the backward
light cones is already given, nothing more that could be
causally relevant for Rbj can be inferred from an instance
of Lai .
Along this line of reasoning the total state V of the
overlap of the backward lightcones9 of Lai and R
b
j is a
common cause variable which screens off the correlation:
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Li ∧Rj ∧ Vq) = p(Lai |Li ∧Rj ∧ Vq)
× p(Rbj |Li ∧Rj ∧ Vq). (45)
The common past Vq cannot be altered by choosing one
or the other direction for the spin measurement—“facta
infecta fieri non possunt” [18, p. 185]. Therefore the
total state Vq of the common past is indeed a common
common cause variable for all correlated outcomes, see
FIG. 3.
This reasoning can be questioned along the following
lines. It is reasonable that not all event types that are
instantiated in the overlap of the backward light cones of
two coinciding instances of the correlated event types are
causally relevant for these latter event types. Therefore
8 For a very good and more detailed discussion of this, see [13].
9 One might argue that the total state of the union of the backward
lightcones is a better candidate for a common cause variable [13].
The following discussion carries over also to this case.
8conditionalizing on the total state is conditionalizing not
only on the relevant factors but also on the irrelevant.
Moreover, it is conceivable that which event types of the
common past are relevant and which are not differs for
different measurements. Claiming that the total state of
the common past is a common common cause variable,
one is thus committed to assume that
“conditionalizing on all other events [. . . ] in
addition to those affecting [the correlated
event types], does not disrupt the stochastic
independence induced by conditionalizing on
the affecting events.” [13]
In particular in the light of Simpson’s paradox [28] this
assumption has been challenged [29]. Here, we will not
assess arguments in favour of or against the possibility
that conditionalizing on irrelevancies yields unexpected
statistical dependencies. Our point is that by weaken-
ing the assumption in the way we did, our derivation is
conclusive whatever may be the answer to this question.
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